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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Project Summary 
This project, which continues through 30 June 2016, was designed to study the responses 
of small and medium powers in the Indian Ocean region to a rise in Sino-Indian rivalry in 
that region. It builds on a previous project in which we examined India’s response to 
increased Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean region. In this phase, we applied the 
same analytical framework that we used in the initial study, namely one drawn from the 
field of international relations in which a country’s options range from “balancing” to 
“bandwagoning.” Thus far, we have completed studies on Australia and Sri Lanka. 
 
Background 
China’s ongoing economic expansion has facilitated growth in Chinese military power, 
including an increase in Chinese Navy (PLAN) capabilities. These capabilities and 
Chinese soft power will enable China to expand its reach across the Asia-Pacific and into 
the Indian Ocean region (IOR). This is likely to lead to rivalry with India, which aims to 
achieve some form of maritime dominance in the IOR. Smaller states in the region will 
face a complex set of choices about whether to balance with one power against another; 
whether to seek partners from outside the region to balance against India and China; and 
whether to bandwagon with one or both of these Asian powers.  
 
Experts are divided over the choices that these countries will make. Some predict that the 
opportunities for joint economic gains between China and states in the IOR, as well as the 
high cost of competition and conflict with an increasingly powerful and assertive China, 
will create strong incentives for smaller states to cooperate with China. In such a 
cooperative scenario, states may not simply strike economic deals with China—they may 
bandwagon more broadly with the Chinese, acquiescing in the rules, institutions, and 
military arrangements favored by Beijing for management of the IOR. Other analysts 
expect that these states will view an increased Chinese regional presence as more of a 
threat than an opportunity. In response, they will likely take steps to balance against the 
potential dangers of Chinese power, including such measures as arms racing and regional 
and extra-regional alliance seeking with India and others. 
 
The first phase of this study focused on India’s expected reaction to PLAN encroachment 
into the IO. It used an analytical framework that divided India’s options between 
balancing and bandwagoning—with regard not just to China, but also to the United 
States, or a U.S.-led coalition, which is likely to be the other major player in the IO 
region.  
  
In this phase of the study, the same framework is being applied to small and medium 
powers in the Indian Ocean region, mainly Sri Lanka and Australia. Because of their 
strategic locations, these states are important to any assessment of the regional security 
environment. 
 
Findings and Conclusions (to include Process) 
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So far, this project has produced two FOUO reports, one on Australia and the other on Sri 
Lanka. Since the project remains underway, its findings remain tentative. However these 
findings can be summarized with respect to both countries.  
 
Like India, Australia views China’s rising power in the IOR as a multifaceted challenge, 
not just to its own security but also to the liberal political and economic order on which 
regional peace and prosperity has rested. In response to this challenge, Australia is much 
more inclined to balance with a U.S.-led coalition rather than bandwagon with China. 
However, there is growing uncertainty in Australia about American willingness and 
ability to underwrite this sort of coalition over the long run. As a result, Australia will 
continue to pursue a policy of “strategic diversity,” which emphasizes closer cooperation 
not just with the United States, but with other regional countries – including China, 
whose economy is crucial to Australia’s own economic growth. 
 
In contrast to India and Australia, Sri Lanka lacks a coherent, long-term strategic vision 
regarding the Indian Ocean region. Its leaders are less concerned with geopolitical 
alignments and regional security architectures than with post-conflict redevelopment, 
economic growth, and domestic political survival. Leaders are willing to accept Indian 
assistance, but are warier of Indian intentions than Chinese. In the past, they have sought 
to balance against India, but have never managed to break free from its orbit. They have 
not sought to balance against China. The United States does not figure prominently in Sri 
Lankan strategic thought and is not seen as a reliable long-term partner. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Follow-on studies would examine additional countries and their responses to the same 
dynamics of Sino-Indian rivalry. In particular, those that occupy locations between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, would be crucial cases since 
they face China on one side and India on the other and hence are likely to face pressures 
from both of Asia’s rising powers. Myanmar and Thailand present similar challenges. 
Although Myanmar does not touch the Pacific Ocean, it is located between India and 
China and is accustomed to dealing with pressures from both of its large neighbors. 
Thailand does not share any borders with China, but has a sea border with India. 
Recently, Myanmar and Thailand have experienced significant political changes, which 
have reshaped their foreign policies and their vulnerability to Sino-Indian rivalry. 
 
Apart from additional country-focused studies, it would also be useful to examine the 
implications of the first two sets of findings for the U.S. policy of rebalancing to the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific region.  
